The Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Islâh): The Difficult Process of Building a Project for Change

Laurent Bonnefoy et Marine Poirier 1
The Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Tajammu' al-yamanî lil-islâh) , commonly known as al-Islâh, was established on September 13, 1990 , a few months after the unification of North and South Yemen and the legalization of a multi-party system. It was created at a time of profound changes in the Yemeni political system, which went from a single-party system in each of the two Yemens (the General People's Congress in North Yemen and the Yemeni Socialist Party in South Yemen) to a political project in a unified Yemen who regarded itself as openly democratic. Opposition parties were then allowed (except based on regionalist or sectarian grounds) and within a year, 20 political parties were accounted for. Partisan and independent press also emerged, elections were organized, and a new constitution was drafted. Though sudden, the transition was initially rather painless and free of major violence or protest, even within the two former single parties. 2 Al-Islâh is often described as the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It does, however encompass diverse religious, ideological and sociopolitical tendencies 1 . Members of the Muslim Brotherhood are largely associated with a traditionalist and "tribal" wing (less directly ideological (al-Abdali*, 2007) ) as well as with business elites who do not fit in either category, some of whom with close ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies 2 . study of al-Islâh party, the subject of this chapter, we shall begin with some facts on the original "Yemeni political formula". 4 Historically, the "republican revolution" of September 26, 1962 , which overthrew the Zaydi Imamate in North Yemen, only managed to establish itself after eight years of civil war, following a peace agreement between republicans and royalists. The compromise led to a peculiar balance of power, whose basic mechanism has endured even after the unification of North and South Yemen, even if subjected to various pressures and becoming the reason for contentions. The balance was based primarily on the rejection, albeit incomplete, of the denominational cleavage between the Zaydis (a Shiite minority predominantly found in the northern highlands and clearly distinct from the Twelver Shiites found in Iran) and the Sunni Shafeis. Hence, even within the republican framework built in opposition to the Zaydi Imamate, all presidents of North Yemen and later of unified Yemen were of Zaydi origin. Yet none of them laid direct claims to their identity; instead they encouraged to look beyond inherited religious identities .
5
Led by military inspired by Nasserist ideology, the revolutionaries of September 26, 1962 engaged in a long civil war against a royalist stronghold, made up mainly of Zaydis from the high plateaus of the northwestern region of North Yemen and supported by Saudi Arabia. Progressively, the violence and determination of the Egyptian-backed military failed, and the revolutionary group began to fall apart. In December 1994, historical figures of the Yemeni Free Movement -including Muhammad al-Zubayrî and Ahmad Nu'mân, mayor leaders of the revolution (Douglas, 1987) -denounced the corruption of the ruling power controlled by Colonel 'Abd Allâh Sallâl. At the end of 1967, the Royalists surrounded Sanaa for 70 days and appeared to be in a position to reinstate the Imamate. At that time, the Republicans had lost the support of the Egyptian army, busy elsewhere and defeated on the Israeli front. In order to end the North Yemen deadlock, a compromise was drafted that aimed at reintegrating tribes (not just Zaydi tribes) and the pro-royalist Zaydi religious establishment more systematically into state structures. Beyond bringing peace to the country and stabilizing the republican regime, the compromise led to a purge of some "left-leaning" servicemen and the co-optation of some royalist political leaders. 6 For more than 40 years, the foundational compromise of contemporary Yemen's political formula (in which former South Yemen has been engaged since 1990) has enabled participation to power of different political forces with various ideological tendencies (leftwing, republicans, Arab nationalists, traditionalists, the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis) or multiple identity referents (Zaydism, Sunnism, tribalism) . Therefore, regime leaders have gained recognition by drawing, whether simultaneously or alternately, on various registers. moving beyond Zaydi and Chafei religious identities during the second half of the 20th century and creating a more global identity. Such movement shielded the Yemeni society from sectarian stigmatization, even if it re-emerges every now and then, as with the Saada War which began in 2004 between the Yemeni army and the Believing Youth (alShabab al-Mu'min) , a group professing Zaydi revival led by the al-Hûthî family (Dorlian, 2008) . The Yemeni national army also reorganized partially around individuals who were close to Islamists of various tendencies. In 1982, the General People's Congress (GPC, alMu'tamar al-sha'bî al-'âmm) , a partisan structure aiming at uniting all political movements, was established in North Yemen. At the time, in addition to President 'Alî 'Abd Allâh Sâlih's autocratic inclination, the GPC also expressed the President's wish to postpone the legalization of the multi-party system.
8
The participation of various political movements exemplifies the capacity of integration characterizing the regime of the Yemen Arab Republic and explains why the North Yemeni society, which constitutes about 80% of the overall population of unified Yemen, had not experienced any violent and profound cleavage between state power and traditional tribal and religious members on the one hand, and Islamist movements on the other hand, until well into the 2000s. Although real, dissidences such as the guerilla movement of the National Democratic Front, financed by South Yemen in the 1970s, have remained essentially peripheral, and, in any case, have not led to any massive state repression.
9
In his analysis of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, Renaud Detalle declared in 1997 that one of the major stakes in Yemen's political future was "the Islamists' emancipation from state tutorship." Over ten years later, have Islamists in general and al-Islâh in particular managed to free themselves from the power in place? Does the party still represent a "restrained" (Burgat, 1999, p. 241), "discreet, peaceful and intellectual" (alYamani, 2003, p. 55) opposition, or has it evolved into a real political opposition force with a plausible project for change? 10 Our study of al-Islâh deals primarily with the evolution of the party in its Yemeni context. How are al-Islâh's strategies, resources and mobilization affected by the context's changes due to internal and external factors (increasing monopoly of President Sâlih and the General People's Congress, and "Global War on Terror")? How can al-Islâh's destiny, forever oscillating between pro-power and opposition strategies, symbolize the paradoxes of a political landscape that is both "gaining" pluralism (through the institutionalization of the opposition) and "losing" pluralism (through the ruling power's hegemony over resources)?
11 We shall first examine the impact of political and social structures on al-Islâh. How does the party fit into a landscape shaped by institutions, political, social and religious identities, other parties, and ideological debates? How does the cause defended by al-Islâh interact with other agendas and identity referents? Subsequently, we shall look into alIslâh's resources and repertoires in an effort to understand, in our final segment, the strategies aimed at achieving emancipation and building a project for political change. Gathering and institutionalization of preexisting movements 12 Ever since it emerged in 1990, al-Islâh party has had little difficulty in representing a credible political power within the particular framework of the "Yemeni formula" and the political system in post-unification Yemen. It has been regarded as an alternative power despite the close relationship between some of its founders and the ruling regime. For almost two decades, the party has played on this ambiguity, both inside and outside of the political regime. When they established their party, the leaders were no beginners in politics; they had long been active in the field: 'Abd Allâh al-Ahmar, sheikh of the Hâshid tribal confederation, who chaired al-Islâh until his death in December 2007 had been, since the 1960s, a key figure in the interaction between the republican power, the tribal system and Islamism. Al-Ahmar was considered as instrumental in rallying leading Zaydi tribes from the northern highlands to the republic during the 1960s. When the General People's Congress was established in 1982, he was appointed as a permanent council member 3 . Consequently, al-Islâh's emergence on the political scene in 1990 made possible the institutionalization of various pre-existing political forces such as, among others, the Muslim Brotherhood branch, which operated at the time either within the framework of the ruling General People's Congress, or in a non-institutional even semiclandestine fashion through militias fighting against the socialists in the 1970s and 1980s 4 . The various tribal, Islamist and commercial components of al-Islâh seem to have rallied around symbolic figures such as 'Abd Allâh al-Ahmar, Muhammad al-Yadûmî and 'Abd alMajîd al-Zindânî, as well as around more political slogans, such as the preservation of traditional tribal and religious values, the refusal to share power with socialists as imposed by the unity agreement, or the fight against corruption. The three wings that make up the party do not systematically compete with one another; they coexist generally and agree on these issues. Each wing, however, uses different repertoires and mobilization methods, which may reflect a potential division of political tasks. Hence, the tribal component is made up of a pool of men and voters who seem to influence the relation between the ruling power and al-Islâh more often than not. The Islamist component contributes their ideology and acitivists, whereas the commercial component contributes their networks and respectability. Less than three years after it was created, al-Islâh results during the 1993 legislative elections, ranked ehaed of the Yemeni Socialist Party and second to the General People's Congress of President 'Alî 'Abd Allâh Sâlih 5 .
13 Early on, al-Islâh derived much of its legitimacy in North Yemen from the tribal system prevailing in the highlands (the role of sheikhs, the legal system, the code of honor (Dresh, 1993) ) and from the historical contribution of Islamist movements throughout the numerous founding stages of contemporary Yemen, especially during the 1962 revolution. Therefore, ever since it was established, al-Islâh was able to represent a significant political force capable of challenging the ruling party directly. Even though the republican regime had also based much of its legitimacy on the mobilization of traditional groups and symbols, al-Islâh had done it even more systematically and more ostentatiously. In the former South Yemen areas, the pressure put by state institutions on traditional (tribal and religious) elites during the socialist period led to a conservative reaction, after the 1990s unification, reminiscent of the reaction that occurred in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia (Petric, 2002) at that time. This reaction, in turn, 14 Moreover, the party's official denomination, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, directly reflected the integration of the party structure into the debates and references that characterized the post-unification political system in Yemen. In fact, the word "party" implies a negative connotation specific to Yemeni history and associated with division, corruption, and exclusive allegiances. During the 1980s, the political scene in contemporary Yemen was largely influenced and dominated by the General People's Congress, who broke away -at least formally -from the party structure and their call for a hizb (party) for the sake of a solidarity that transcends and stigmatizes party divides. Since the 1980s, the Yemeni Salafi movement led by Muqbil al-Wâdi'î has brandished a founding principle based on rejecting hizbiyya (partisanship), i-e partisan structure and electoral participation . In spite of their relatively marginalized position, they managed to initiate a debate and stigmatize the very concept of parties. Mistrust of partisan politics was reinforced by the fact that the socialist period in the South between 1970 and 1990 is frequently referred to as "ayyâm al-hizb" (i.e. the days of the party). In collective imagination, the word "party" thus refers primarily to the Yemeni Socialist Party, and the term "tajammu" (congregation) adopted by al-Islâh seems, in effect, much more positive 6 .
15 Al-Islâh also managed to play a significant part in the Yemeni political landscape by capitalizing on the historical role of the Muslim Brotherhood or other reformist groups close to them (including some of the Free Yemenis led by Muhammad al-Zubayrî) in the process of building the republican compromise, achieving the goal of bringing together religious identities and moving beyond primary Zaydi and Chafei identities by recruiting, ever since the party was created, members of both groups without discrimination. The Muslim Brotherhood participated directly in the early phase of the process of political and social modernization; indeed, as mentioned earlier, the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen did not begin with the establishment of al-Islâh. They were involved in the first revolution attempt in 1948 when they delegated Algerian revolutionary Fudhayl al-Wartilâni. In an attempt to lay the foundations of the republican project, Muhammad al-Zubayrî, described by his companions as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood 7 and later assassinated in 1965, created in 1964 a "Party of God" (Hizb Allâh) (Burgat, Camberlin, 2002) , thus asserting his conviction that religion was the only referential authority capable of reconciling the republic with a highly conservative rural society where royalists were recruiting. The "tribal-Islamist" alliance later played a part in the republican movement and in defending the regime against protest. 18 While al-Islâh may be labeled as an Islamist party, it does not have a monopoly on the denomination. On the contrary, it is part of a varied landscape where multiple references compete, condemn and sometimes overlap and complement one another. These groups include the Muslim Brotherhood (who represent the ideology-oriented branch of al-Islâh), "jihadist" fringes, Salafis, Sufis, and Zaydi revival groups. Each group has their own opinion on four key issues, namely participation in partisan politics, loyalty to the regime, violent confrontation with the rulers, and stigmatization of other religious and political identities (Bonnefoy, 2009 ).
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Returning to Political Parties? The strictly "Islamist" field is not al-Islâh's only competitor; the religious repertoire is predominantly based on consensus and regularly exploited by partisan groups on the Yemeni political scene. 20 The designation of al-Islâh as an Islamist party (in the broad sense of the word, i.e. as a party whose aim is to "speak the Muslim language" and, as François Burgat says, "resort in a privileged and sometimes ostentatious manner to a rhetoric borrowed from the Muslim culture." (Burgat, 2005, p. 15) ) may also be challenged based on the rather heterogeneous nature of its leaders and members, on the diversity of positions they hold (Bonnefoy, Ibn Sheikh, 2002) and on the regime's ability to use the same rhetoric in addition to religious symbols. Nevertheless, the party's platform, positions, practices and repertoires are largely consistent with Muslim culture and are clearly part of a conservative framework (defense of traditions and tribal values, distrust of modernization often perceived as synonymous with westernization, support for Islamic
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Returning to Political Parties? causes); as a result, al-Islâh shares common characteristics with other Islamist parties in the Middle East and yet, at the same time, it deviates from the dominant rhetoric of the regime based on the democratization process, economic development and security. For example, in 1991, al-Islâh activists drew general attention when they criticized Article 3 of the new constitution which stipulated that the Sharia was the primary source of legislation rather than the only one, as the Islamists wished. In 1994, following the war between the ruling regime in the North and the southern secessionists, a constitutional amendment was adopted and al-Islâh won its case on this controversial issue.
militant social action and virulent criticism against the very foundations of the regime or against its alleged corruption in the name of the Muslim Brotherhood's doctrine 11 , as well as the (often depoliticized) attempts to produce local notabilities as alternatives to the General People's Congress' candidates 12 . Consequently, the idea whereby al-Islâh is merely a bogus, fake opposition party is not relevant. Given the inclusive formula of the Yemeni political system and the characteristics of the republican compromise, al-Islâh's emancipation from its various legacies or sponsorships (whether ideological through the socialists' stigmatization or social through tribal and political allegiances based on their alliance with power) can only be understood as a long process. Al-Islâh definitely has multiple resources and can achieve self-sufficiency and autonomy from the ruling party and smooth the way for an openly admitted opposition.
Resources and Mobilization
25 An analysis of al-Islâh's resources and mobilization patterns is interesting for a number of reasons. On the one hand, it sheds light on the particular position of the structure within the Yemeni political system; that is to say it shows the mobilization of varied resources within the framework of limited pluralism 13 . On the other hand, it reveals the relation between directly politicized mobilization patterns (via Islamist ideology or adaptable protest) and other less explicitly political resources (sometimes even described as apolitical) associated for instance, with tribal, economic or patronage allegiances. Obviously, the two types of resources are inextricably linked. However, it seems relevant to differentiate between the "rental" resources linked to the party's regional or tribal allegiances representing a support base that can be mobilized beyond the realms of ideology or programs, and mobilizations related with the party's active participation in the community charities, education and religion, which are more obviously part of other Islamist parties' activities elsewhere in the Middle East.
A tribal and economic "rent" based on identities 26 Since the early 1990s, al-Islâh's double Islamist and tribal affiliation has been used to consolidate the party's presence on the political and electoral landscape. The "rental" resources described further, may seem, a priori, depoliticized and non-ideological. However, they are ambivalent because, by nature, they limit the party's autonomy. In fact, they give the party a seemingly efficient mobilization capacity with a quasiautomatic base of voters, elected representatives and activists and they make possible the creation of strongholds. However, at the same time, the party's independence as a whole becomes contingent on the strategy -sometimes even on the interests -of the figures who symbolize these resources primarily based on tribal or regional allegiance networks and on charismas that can be described as traditional and that some al-Islâh leaders rely on for mobilization purposes in certain areas. These "rental" resources are not necessarily based on political projects or programs designed to convince voters and activists; rather, they are linked to the special positions held by some leaders (local or tribal notability, historical role, wealth from trade, etc.).
27 In addition to the al-Ahmar clan led at first by 'Abd Allâh, and since late 2007 by Sâdiq, the Abû Luhûm family led by Sheikh Sinân from the region of Nihm (one of the main figures of the Bakîl tribal confederation) plays an important role in this particular Jam'iyya lil-islâh al-ijtima'î al-khayriyya) , that is officially independent from the party but contributes nonetheless to spreading the party' guiding principles and ensuring part of its popularity.
28 Such resources have inevitably led to regional disparities, and, since the early 1990s, to the creation of electoral strongholds, especially in some tribal zones to the north of Sanaa where the local sheikh is affiliated with al-Islâh (in the governorates of 'Amrân and Hajjah for instance). Nevertheless, this mobilization system proved fragile, and the party lost many "tribal" districts during elections (in 1997, then in 2003) , which led it to promote a more autonomous strategy. 31 This privileged access to means of mobilization (through allegedly non-political commercial companies) has made it possible for al-Islâh's members or sympathizers to network and create common references. Accordingly, even if non exclusive or systematic, a contract signed with Sabafon rather than its competitors may sometimes be perceived as a political act and a sign of allegiance to al-Islâh in particular, and also to the opposition in general. While other companies, especially those established by Hâ'il Sa'îd (alTadhâmun International Islamic Bank, Abû Walad Biscuit Factory) apparently do not supply direct financing to the party, they remain close to it and support its social base by building mosques (especially in Aden in the mid-1990s) and buying advertising spots in Community action 32 These "rental" resources are completed and most probably reinvested in community action through more direct mobilizations. From charities to mosques to schools, al-Islâh's wide range of resources and repertoires, resulting from its members fervor, helps strengthen the party's influence and ensures its popularity and visibility on the Yemeni political landscape. The party is actually surrounded by a cluster of actors performing in various fields, including charity, education, mass media, religion and human rights. In order to understand the scope of al-Islâh's diverse, numerous mobilizing resources one cannot ignore this large collection of social networks; they are not always coordinated or even institutionalized, yet they create a team spirit and share a number of references and objectives that define the political and ideological principles of the party. (Johnsen, 2006) . Although it is officially independent and free from government control, it is widely associated with the party and constitutes a reservoir for rallying young people and religious elites in Yemen and abroad. 37 The same holds true for the University of Science and Technology (Jâma'at al-'ulûm wa altiknûlûjiyâ) in Sanaa and its various branches in all major cities. Established in 1994, it was built on land donated by 'Alî Muhsin, a public figure close to President Sâlih and the military commander of the northern region, a land it shares with an important mosque built by Sheikh Sinân Abû Luhûm. Although the university curriculum, generally regarded as first-rate, is not religion-based and although the structure as a whole is not affected by charges of support to terrorism formulated by the US government against alImân and its president, al-Zindânî, the university is fully integrated into al-Islâh's vast network. Al-Islâh's connections with major tradesmen and figures close to the party contribute indirectly to the university's good reputation and profile. Indeed, the University of Science and Technology Hospital, whose board of directors is chaired by Târiq Sinân Abû Luhûm, is regarded as one of the best in the capital city, which helps cement the university's local roots and image of modernity and efficiency, in opposition to the underdeveloped and difficulty-ridden public universities and hospitals 22 .
38 Al-Islâh also relies on a large media network as another mobilization tool. A wide-ranging press helps the party spread their views and take part in processing information. The network includes al-Sahwa and al-Asima, two weekly newspapers affiliated with the party, al-Masdar and al-Nâs, two independent weekly publications with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Nûr, a monthly magazine previously named Nawâfidh. These publications expand the party's presence within the social fabric by speaking on behalf of the "Islâhî" cause and its variations. The politically-oriented press is supplemented by a publishing network with partisan political and religious markers: printing presses (such as al-Afâq, owned by the al-Ahmar family), and specialized bookshops and shops selling religious DVDs and tapes (such as tasjîlât al-Imân) are all indirect mobilization tools used by al-Islâh. 39 Moreover, al-Islâh benefits from religious, institutional and informal structures that help develop its local presence and influence. Friday sermons are perhaps the most obvious mobilization tool, and their openly political orientation is a great asset for the party, all the more so as the domination -even the control -of mosques and training institutes by religious scholars close to the Muslim Brotherhood has been increasing in the South (notably in Aden) since 1994 and in traditionally Zaydi areas since 2004 23 . Under the supervision of al-Islâh members, Koran courses for children taught in the afternoon or during the summer and literacy courses for women in rural regions, in addition to regular participation in prayers at the mosque all help create social networks that are beneficial to the party. This is particularly true in predominantly feminine circles. Indeed, political socialization seems less easy for women (men are invited to take part in political debates at a young age during qat sessions 24 ) and is mainly done through social structures linked 42 al-Islâh obviously has no qualms about using all available means and tools to publicize its doctrine and recruit sympathizers and activists 26 . In terms of mobilization, the party clearly benefits from varied resources that make up its solid local base and important followers' networks. 43 As a result, members of al-Islâh are just as likely to participate in strictly political activities as they are to be involved in socioeconomic or religious activities that are more or less connected to the party. The reasons for loyalty between the various leanings and the political parties are not always easy to identify; however, they do exist and provide an explanation for "Islâhî" activism. The relationship between these "targeted" segments of population (sympathizers, charity beneficiaries, readers, voters, etc.) and the party varies according to circumstances that depend on their expectations as well as on the types of capital and arguments used to mobilize them. 44 In this respect, al-Islâh's membership is complex, because it is based on diverse forms of relationships with the party and commitment towards different objects and fields. Nevertheless, these networks are inextricably linked because they represent solidarity
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and community networks with common religious beliefs. Therefore, social fabrics are not unified, but rather bridged together by these common values that ease mobility and transfer from one field of action to another. If, as sources close to al-Islâh believe, the party constitutes the largest partisan structure in Yemen, it may realistically be considered as a popular party, if not as a mass party. Beyond political divisions, recruitment is based on religious references largely shared among the population. In addition to patronage and solidarity networks, the party's support is founded on a social and religious conservative position, which may be regarded by some as the "interpreter of the Yemeni society's culture 27 ."
45 Besides a substantial base of activists, al-Islâh is privileged to have a national and local organizational structure far more developed than its competitors (al-Yamani, 2003, p. 52). Local branches add dynamism to a partisan life often portrayed as elitist. Strong management provides coherence to these heterogeneous networks. Indeed, while al-Islâh is made up of different groups who sometimes hold opposing opinions, its internal "pluralism" is offset by the influence of the party leaders, who seem to exert rigorous control over party members. That's why al-Islâh followers often boast about the richness of their party, anchored in the variety of positions expressed within the party, and reject the fact that such richness may be a source of internal divisions, since the decisions taken by the General Secretariat or the Consultative Council are respected and supported by the masses 28 . In fact, despite the internal diversity of the party, positions are generally endorsed by all members, who are less inclined to publicly display their disagreements than Socialist Party members for exemple. The authority emanating from the relatively closed circle of the party's political elite may be explained by "the charisma of the leadership 29 " or by the existence of an allegiance mechanism, whose functionality is strengthened by the fact that many members view their commitment to the party through a religious prism.
The Difficult Process of Emancipation: Building an Alternative Force 46 Since the late 1990s, al-Islâh's leadership has endorsed a strategy of alliance and cooperation with other opposition movements, and particularly with their historic enemy, the Yemeni Socialist Party (Browers, 2007) . How do Islamists negotiate their merger with the opposition? What are the consequences of relinquishing a system based on loyalty? The final part of our study will focus on the realization of al-Islâh's emancipation potential, mentioned earlier. How are resources converted and mobilized to re-create a concrete opposition project?
The party from 1990 to 1997: between alliance and opposition 47 Following the Yemeni unification in 1990, President Ali 'Abd Allâh Sâlih was confronted with socialist elites from the former South Yemen, who -even if destabilized -were to rule the country with him in accordance with the unity agreement. In an effort to change the balance of forces, Sâlih turned more overtly to al-Islâh and other Islamist groups, including Salafis and other groups linked to the movement of Zaydi revival. By co-opting them in place and stead of his socialist "partners", he altered the boundaries and territories of the opposition. 48 Between 1993 and 1997, the Yemeni government was composed of al-Islâh ministers representing the various leanings of the party. They held relatively important positions, such as Education, Religious Affairs, Justice and one deputy prime minister. In October 1993, President Sâlih appointed 'Abd al-Majîd al-Zindânî, who had been living in Saudi Arabia for several years and was entrusted with Islamist mobilization in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to the five-member Presidential Council. Al-Islâh was thus introduced in the institution, whose task was to provide the president with assistance and which had been, until then, composed of three members of the General People's Congress and two socialists. Moreover, the 1993 election of al-Islâh chairman 'Abd Allâh al-Ahmar to the office of Parliament Speaker was carried by the votes of the ruling party. The cooperation between the ruling power and al-Islâh reached a climax in 1994 during the brief war between the armies and political elites of the two former Yemeni entities. Paradoxically, the war was also to help speed up its decline.
49 Al-Islâh Islamists provided theological legitimization for the war and took part in combat operations with armed militias trained for this purpose by tribal factions and other militants recently returned from Afghanistan. During the fighting, al-Islâh member 'Abd al-Wahhâb al-Daylamî, who was later appointed minister of Justice immediately after the war, issued a fatwa equating secessionists with impious individuals (Schwedler, 2004, p. 217) . The president benefited from his partnership with al-Islâh during the struggle between northern and southern elites for political hegemony in unified Yemen. However the partnership was no longer of use when the North achieved military supremacy over the South and the Yemeni Socialist Party, brought down to its knees, was compelled to rebuild itself around individuals who had rejected secession. The alliance game of the General People's Congress changed with the quasi-total disappearance of its socialist rival. Although al-Islâh was granted nine ministerial portfolios in October 1994, the Islamists' influence was progressively limited, while the authority of the General People's Congress increased. Al-Islâh was gradually excluded from decision-making circles, even though the elites of both parties maintained a close relationship.
50 The first visible, albeit incomplete, split occurred in 1997. In keeping with their ambiguous position vis-à-vis the ruling power, the party leadership signed a declaration of cooperation with the Higher Coordination Council for the Opposition 30 in August 1996, and a vast majority of its MPs boycotted the 1997 budget vote. However, they were not quite ready to relinquish their alliance with the General People's Congress. They published a statement in October of the same year, to emphasize their wish to maintain a strong relationship with the ruling party (Schwedler, 2004, p. 221) . On April 27, 1997 however, the parties were unable to reach an electoral agreement, which resulted in GPC candidates running against al-Islâh's, in addition to several candidates from minor parties. al-Islâh emerged as the new -and almost unique -opposition party, in the absence of socialists who boycotted the elections; they won 22% of the votes, but lost 10 seats compared to 1993, while the General People's Congress gained 60 extra seats, dominating parliament by a wide margin 31 . Following the relative defeat in the elections, probably aggravated by various voting irregularities, al-Islâh was also excluded from the government, as no portfolio was granted to the party members in the new cabinet. The role of political backup, once held by al-Islâh, was then briefly played by the small Zaydi al-Haqq Party, whose Secretary General Ahmad al-Shâmî was appointed Minister of Endowments. The co-optation of a firm opponent to the Muslim Brotherhood was
implicitly aimed at undermining the party's position among religious or educational institutions, particularly the famous Scientific Institutes (ma'ahid 'ilmiyya).
51 Yet, the break between al-Islâh and the ruling power in 1997 was not quite clear: The threats of boycotting the legislative elections, waged by some al-Islâh figures in the partisan press, were never carried out. The party never used the name of the president in their statements and criticism, however virulent. Furthermore, 'Abd Allâh al-Ahmar was reelected as parliament speaker with the support of General People's Congress MPs. It seems that a head-on confrontation with the ruling power of Ali 'Abd Allâh Sâlih was the red line that al-Islâh was ultimately unable -or simply unwilling -to cross during the 1990s. Therefore, the party did not enter any candidate for the 1999 presidential elections. Najîb Qahtân al-Sha'bî, a member of the GPC, ran against President Sâlih in an attempt to give a touch of credibility to an election where the incumbent president won with more than 96% of the vote (Wedeen, 2008) .
Progressive rallying to the opposition platform 52 As the party leaders began to explore the possibility of cooperation with opposition parties, particularly with socialists, al-Islâh's change in strategy occurred progressively when their political situation evolved: agreements were found when al-Islâh was excluded from political decision-making circles. The party's survival and credibility were at stake when they joined the opposition platform. Yet, the shift in allegiance and the internal reform made it possible for the party to remain "in the game." Does this reveal a surge in pragmatism among Islamists? The answer is yes, insofar as efforts are made to forego historical ideological rivalries between Islamists and socialists to the benefit of these new forms of cooperation. We cannot ignore, however, that while a partnership with the General People's Congress seemed rather "natural", it was also primarily tactical and dependent on the leaders' personal interrelations. 53 Al-Islâh's opposition strategy emerged at the same time as the process of cooperation among opposition parties led by the Yemeni Socialist Party. The latter, in an effort to restructure itself around reformist figures such as Jâr Allâh 'Umar 32 , chose to renew a dialogue with the ruling elites and return to the political arena after the 1997 boycott. The socialists, who had worked since 1995 at bringing together opposition parties into a Higher Coordination Council for the Opposition, reached out to al-Islâh's. Numerous contacts were made and forums were organized, such as the Political Development Forum (muntadâ al-tanmiya al-siyâsiyya) led by 'Alî Sayf Hasan, with the participation of reformist elites from both parties; as a result a common platform was institutionalized. These bridge-building efforts revealed the increasingly pressing need for opposition parties to develop long-lasting mechanisms of cooperation against the backdrop of a shrinking political stage (Burgat, 2000) .
54 During the 2001 local elections and referendum, al-Islâh was all the more committed to the opposition's campaign as the General People's Congress criticized and publicly accused the party of "electoral terrorism." (Browers, 2007, p. 570) . Opposition parties reached agreements among themselves in an attempt to secure a maximum number of seats in local councils and fight against a number of constitutional amendments. The campaign failed, amendments were ratified by referendum with close to 75% of the votes, and the General People's Congress prevailed in local councils. The defeat was as much the result of a lack of transparency in the elections and probable ballot-rigging as it was the
result of a poorly coordinated ineffective opposition campaign. Nevertheless, the episode was an important step in the bridge building process between al-Islâh and the leftwing and the validation of the party's new role amid the opposition. al-Islâh denounced the fraud and insecurity -violent clashes marred the campaign and the voting process -and for some time refused to acknowledge the results published by the government 33 .
55 The post-9/11 era gave al-Islâh members the opportunity to consolidate their opposition strategy. While Yemen was heavily criticized by the international community and accused of providing a safe haven for groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, President Sâlih took a stand in the war against terrorism, and confronted al-Islâh with a security-oriented position. A victim of this criminalization process, al-Islâh leadership, particularly the more Islamist oriented wing, intensified their efforts to build up the opposition platform and took part in the establishment of the Joint Meeting Parties (Ahzab al-liqâ' al-mushtarak ). The Meeting, whose successful breakthrough on the political stage only materialized in 2005, took part for the first time in the 2003 legislative elections. Agreements were then reached between al-Islâh and the Yemeni Socialist Party in more than half of all electoral districts in an effort to avoid fragmenting anti-government votes (Schwedler and Clark, 2006; Carapico, 2003) .
56 In November 2005, the opposition was further unified by the publication of the "Unified project plan for a comprehensive national and political reform" by the Joint Meeting. The program, which set the political agenda of the unified opposition, was cosigned by al-Islâh , the Yemeni Socialist Party, the Nasserite Popular Unionist Organization, the National Arab Socialist Baath Party, al-Haqq Party and the Union of Popular Forces (two small parties with Zaydi referents). Parties of the Joint Meeting agreed on supporting a single presidential candidate for the 2006 election and organized the opposition's first ever presidential campaign. The joint platform was then created, in spite of the reluctance of some members (some even regarded an alliance with "atheist" socialists as treason and opposed the platform). The unified opposition supported the candidacy of Faysal bin Shamlân, a former Oil Minister and an independent public figure, despite his southern roots indirectly associated with socialists. Al-Islâh Islamists saw in Shamlân the opportunity to end the conflict that riddled the Joint Meeting leadership at the time. While his integrity and honesty most likely appealed to the opposition regardless of individual party political principles, the candidate's position was identified by al-Islâh as close to the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, Shamlân had participated in 1990 in the establishment of the Yemeni Free Platform (al-Minbar al-yamanî al-hurr), considered as the counterpart of the Muslim Brotherhood in the South, before returning to the political stage as an independent figure. Regardless of the lock that guaranteed reelection of Sâlih, Shamlân's relative success (22% of votes) gave the opposition new prospects. Al-Islâh had invested a great deal in the campaign (more than any other party of the Joint Meeting), and made their political resources available to the coalition (mobilization networks, press, experience, etc.) (Poirier, 2008 1990 (Rougier, 1999 . A large majority among Islamists condemned these acts of violence, but they continued to be perpetrated as evidenced by the December 2002 assassination of Jâr Allâh 'Umar, then deputy secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party, during al-Islâh General Congress he was attending as a guest 36 . The Islamist party was therefore compelled to give up their allegation that socialists, because of their secular political leanings, were "unbelievers" working for the West and importing western "impious" practices 37 . It became necessary to put an end to religious discrimination against socialists and call attention to the piousness of some, such as Jâr Allâh 'Umar, and -more generally -to give up a strictly "Islamic" position and focus on socioeconomic criticism. Indeed, stigmatizing attitudes, encouraged and fueled by the ruling power, may actually be relevant again. In the South, the Retired Military Movement, which expanded beyond the boundaries of the socio-professional group led to a resurgence of regionalism and even to secessionist positions among a more radical faction (Mermier, 2008 61 With the emergence of new elites, the party opened up to the international scene particularly through ties maintained with the National Democratic Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy which provide respectability and new sources of political support to the party. In an effort to strengthen their position amid their international networks, al-Islâh has been forced to redefine their ideas and projects in order to comply with the agendas imposed by some organizations. Consequently, in addition to promoting the development of reformist elites, al-Islâh has launched a fullfledged communication campaign in an attempt to emerge as a centrist party committed to democracy and to a moderate Islamic project. This position, associated with the new constraints of the international arena, has also led the party to take a more active part in the opposition.
Should the active participation in the opposition lead to alternation?
62 In this context of reshaping their political allegiances and partisan identity, what role can al-Islâh play as an opposition party within the Joint Meeting? We shall now examine the evolution of the tactics adopted by the opposition coalition, which seem to have switched from dialogue to boycott, as well as the ambivalent positions taken by the party.
63 So far, the Joint Meeting's strategy has been based on their participation in the instituted political game. During the 2006 presidential elections, the coalition thus rose to prominence as the legitimate opposition. The new configuration directly affected the customary lack of electoral transparency and forced the General People's Congress to review their electoral practices and political platform 41 . It is worth noting that the president was forced to make many concessions to his rival by using the same campaign 65 Although al-Islâh was officially involved in the process of establishing the opposition, they seemed willing to let their partners appear in the spotlight, notably Yassîn Sa'îd Nu'mân, secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party, featured many times in the partisan and independent press. Al-Islâh members took a rather reserved stance on events that were wreaking havoc in the country (terrorism, economic crisis, challenges to the North's hegemony over the South, the Saada War). The contrast was striking between their discreet mobilization on the Southern issue on the one hand -especially in light of the repressive steps taken by the government, the release of political prisoners -, or the Saada War and its consequences, and, on the other hand, the efforts they made to boost the boycott campaign of Danish products or the support for Gaza 45 . This attitude of taking a back seat to their partners, no matter how little representative they may be, is undoubtedly a legacy of the 1990s and shows how difficult it is for al-Islâh to achieve emancipation 46 . The talks about amendments to the constitution and the electoral law, and the forthcoming parliamentary elections are expected to be an interesting challenge to the strategy of head-on opposition and alliance, officially embraced by the party.
66 In addition to their cautious behavior, al-Islâh is divided by contrasting ambitions. A significant number of party members are not really willing to get involved in electoral battles and undermine their alliance with the ruling power. Refusal to break away from allegiance to the president also has affected and weakened the unitary movement begun by the party in 2006. For example, on the eve of the presidential elections, al-Islâh's chairman 'Abd Allâh al-Ahmar declared his personal allegiance to President Sâlih which delegitimized Faysal bin Shamlan the party's candidate (al-Shuja'*, 2007) . Many sheikhs of the Hâshid tribal confederation then followed suit and supported the incumbent president. On the whole, traditional affiliations and personal allegiances have endured and to some extent undermined the party's efforts to establish its autonomy. A branch of al-Islâh still rejects political games for the sake of preserving consensus and protecting themselves from government repression at the same time. For example, 'Abd al-Majîd alZindânî has not overtly supported his party's shift to the opposition. He refrained from making any public declaration of allegiance in 2006 and remained silent about the opposition-backed candidate; as the chairman, he hosted the president's visits to al-Imân
university at the beginning and near the end of his electoral campaign. Competition has also come from groups that favor an apolitical approach, particularly the Salafi movement (al-Hikma in particular).
67 Despite profound changes, al-Islâh leadership does not seem willing to break free from their former loyalty to the power in place and do without their "rental" resources. Therefore, the reformist wing could just be a showcase of their commitment amid the Joint Meeting and coexist with more conservative movements. When the party chairman, Sheikh 'Abd Allâh al-Ahmar, who symbolized the historic alliance with President Sâlih, died in December 2007, the party had a major opportunity for emancipation. However, alAhmar's death did not lead to any significant break. 68 Indeed, ideological concessions and outward pragmatism do not have unanimous support among party leaders or members (al-Daghshî*, to be published) 48 . Changing affiliations and rhetoric and partnership with the Yemeni Socialist Party have led to various clashes about the way many partisans view the "Islâhî cause" even if the party's predominant public position is openly in favor of the Joint Meeting. The rhetoric of stigmatization of socialists or Zaydis and the opposition to al-Islâh's new trend remain a reality and continues to reflect the party's internal diversity.
Conclusion 69
The issue of al-Islâh's moderation and its relation to the party's participation in government were the subject of an important research by Jillian Schwedler (2007) . Based on a comparative study with the Jordanian Islamic Action Front, Schwedler's work focuses on the complicated process of opening up and breaking away from radicalism. The author concludes that al-Islâh's participation in the government between 1993 and 1997 and their close ties with the country's ruling elites have had little effect in terms of moderation, defined as the capacity to accept multiple perspectives. Yet al-Islâh's commitment to the Joint Meeting, largely described throughout our study, seems to challenge Schwedler's theory. Indeed, the quest for autonomy, though difficult, is now generally accepted by the party leadership. It involves more radical criticism of the ruling power on themes of corruption or authoritarianism, and a capacity to cooperate with various political groups, primarily with socialists.
70 Since its creation in 1990, al-Islâh has shown a remarkable capacity to adapt, by striking alliances with the ruling power in some cases while successfully preserving its position as an opposition party. This ambivalent strategy made it possible for the party to be spared both by repression and marginalization. The party's numerous resources, whether "rental" or the result of efficient local action, are a real asset for mobilization. Taking advantage of these resources to create an alternation project remains a hypothetical and
fragile process still far from completion. Changes in alliances, constant transitions from co-optation to emancipation, from consensus to criticism, all al-Islâh's trademarks, make the study of this highly rich and complex party both interesting and inspiring to study this highly rich and complex party.
